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LIST OF PARTIES 
This appeal arises out of the alleged breach of a 
contract action in the Fourth District Court, Juab County, be-
fore the Honorable Ray M. Harding. The original parties were 
Eckhoff, Watson, Watson and Preator Engineering, Inc., dba 
Eckhoff, Watson and Preator Engineering, a Utah corporation, and 
the defendants Ralph Memmott, Grace Memmott, Sandra Memmott, Sue 
Memmott, Delbert Crapo, Syrelds Crapo, Trent Crapo and Kent 
Crapo. Mr. Ralph Memmott is appealing a finding solely against 
himself for the payment of services rendered by plaintiff/re-
spondent. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is brought pursuant to Utah Code Anno-
tated, §78-2a-2(h) (1953), granting jurisdiction to this Court 
to hear and decide appeals when such case is transferred and 
assigned by the Supreme Court for the State of Utah. Defendant, 
Ralph Memmott is appealing a judgment rendered by the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in and for Juab County that (i) respon-
dent substantially performed the services contracted for through 
its field survey, office work and resulting work product; (ii) 
that the defendant, Ralph Memmott entered into an agreement 
regarding such services with the plaintiff; and, (iii) that the 
other named defendants have no liability under either the Com-
plaint or the aforementioned agreement. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether or not the evidence supports the finding 
that the respondent substantially performed the work requested 
of it by the appellant. 
2. Whether or not the evidence sufficiently supports 
the finding that the appellant, Ralph Memmott, and respondent 
entered into a valid and binding contract. 
3- Whether or not the copy of the subject contract 
was properly admitted into evidence over appellant's objections. 
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4. Whether or not, under Utah law regarding mining 
partnerships, the appellant, Ralph Memmott, entered into a con-
tract on his own and not on behalf of the other named defen-
dants • 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Every partner is an agent of the partnership for 
the purpose of its business, and the act of every partner, in-
cluding the execution in the partnership name of any instrument 
for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the 
partnership of which he is a member, binds a partner, unless the 
partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the part-
nership in the particular matter and the person with whom he is 
dealing has knowlege of the fact that he has no such authority. 
2. An act of a partner which is not apparently for 
the carrying on of the business of the partnership in the usual 
way does not bind the partnership, unless authorized by the 
other partners. 
3. Unless authorized by the other partners or unless 
they have abandoned the business, one or more but less than all 
of the the partners have no authority to: 
a. Assign the partnership property in trust for 
creditors or on the assignee's promise to pay the debts of the 
partnership. 
-2-
b. Dispose of the goodwill of the business. 
c. Do any other act which would make it impos-
sible to carry on the ordinary business of the partnership. 
d. Confess a judgment. 
e. Submit a partnership claim or liability to 
arbitration or reference. 
4. No act of a partner in contravention of a restric-
tion on authority shall bind the partnership to persons having 
knowledge of the restriction. Utah Code Annotated, §48-1-6 
(1953). 
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or pho-
tograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is re-
quired, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by other 
rules adopted by the Supreme Court of this State or by Statute. 
Rule 1002. Requirement of Original. Utah Rules of Evidence. 
-3-
A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an 
original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the au-
thenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would 
be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. Rule 
1003. Admissibility of Duplicates. Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The original is not required, and other evidence that 
the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph is admis-
sible if: 
(1) Originals lost or destroyed. 
All originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless 
the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith; or 
(2) Original not obtainable. No original can be 
obtained by any available judicial process or procedure; or 
(3) Original in possession of opponent. 
At a time when an original was under the control of 
the party against whom offered, he was put on notice, by the 
pleadings or otherwise, that the content would be a subject of 
proof at the hearing, and he does not produce the original at 
the hearing; or 
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(4) Collateral matters. 
The writing, recording, or photograph is not closely 
related to a controlling issue. Rule 1004, Admissibility of 
other Evidence of Contents. Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant (Ralph Memmott) was found liable for the 
payment to respondent for certain surveying services rendered by 
the respondent at the request of the appellant. 
The defendants, and appellant, Ralph Memmott, herein-
after jointly referred to as "Memmott", appeared with counsel 
for trial on January 6, 1987. The Court, after hearing the 
various testimony of the parties and other witnesses and, after 
having reviewed the materials submitted as exhibits, found that 
the respondent, hereinafter referred to as "EWP", and the appel-
lant, Ralph Memmott, had entered into a written contract whereby 
the respondent was to provide certain survey services to Memmott 
and that Memmott had agreed to pay an estimated fee of $6,000; 
that Ralph Memmott had entered into this agreement individually 
and not for, or on behalf of, any of the other named defendants; 
and, that the respondent had substantially performed the ser-
vices contracted for and expended time and effort in excess of 
that estimated, and that such expenditures were reasonable. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT 
TO ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The named defendants jointly own several placer mining 
claims located in the Scipio, Utah area. (Transcript, pp. 13, 
28, 29, 159). 
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Interstate 15 (1-15) crosses through some of the de-
fendants1 mining claims. (Transcript, pp. 13, 24). As a result 
of 1-15 crossing these various mining claims, the defendants had 
become involved in certain condemnation proceedings with the 
State of Utah. (Transcript, pp. 14-16, 26-28). 
Mr. Ralph Memmott and Mr. Delbert Crapo approached EWP 
in late September 1983, for the purpose of establishing where I-
15 crossed these various mining claims. (Transcript, pp. 21, 
24, 35, 64). The defendants had already identified and marked 
the location of their subject mining claims on both the ground 
as well as on government land office survey maps (hereinafter, 
GLO maps), which they provided to EWP. (Transcript, pp. 24, 27, 
37, 49, 101). 
1-15 was already marked and established on the ground 
with its right-of-way survey markers installed on both sides of 
1-15 and such right-of-way ran along 1-15. 
Memmott had requested EWP to locate 1-15 on their 
mining claims through the surveying of the previously located 
government section corner markers, which also marked the corner 
boundaries of the Memmotts1 subject mining claims, into the 
right-of-way markers running alongside 1-15. Thereafter, EWP 
was to trace 1-15 onto the GLO plat maps provided by Memmott 
showing the exact location of 1-15, and also provide to Memmott 
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the distances and measurements from each government section 
monument to the 1-15 right-of-way markers. Additionally, the 
respondent was asked to verify the surveys of the mining claims 
as shown on Memmotts' placer locators. (Transcript, pp. 35, 37, 
43, 48, 65). 
Some time during the initial meeting, EWP quoted the 
price of $45 per hour for a two-man survey team, plus a reason-
able hourly rate for the necessary office work. (Transcript, 
PP. 34, 35). 
In October 1983, representatives of both EWP and Mem-
raott met at the site of the subject claims, at which time Mem-
mott showed EWP the previously located government section corner 
survey markers as related to their mining claims. (Transcript, 
pp. 24, 27, 37, 49, 101). At this same time, Ralph Memmott and 
EWP executed a certain document. Memmott believes that the 
document was a standard work authorization form (Transcript, pp. 
38-39) and EWP claims that the document was a contract showing 
the estimated price of $6,000, along with other items. (Trans-
cript, pp. 32-33, 59-60). 
EWPfs survey crew spent two days surveying in the 
field and sometime thereafter, EWP provided to Memmott the "as-
built" location, along with the data showing the survey measure-
ments and distances to 1-15, to just two of Memmottsf subject 
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mining claims, using only two of the subject government section 
corner survey markers that Memmott had shown EWP and which mark-
ed the corners of their various mining claims. (Transcript, pp. 
70,77-78, 104, 140). The number of government section monuments 
that had been identified and shown EWP was in excess of twelve. 
(Transcript, p. 49). 
Thereafter, respondent sent to Memmott a bill seeking 
the sum of $6,487.17, the bill showing 34 1/2 hours of field 
survey work and another 74 hours of office work. 
Respondent could have provided the requested survey 
measurements and distances from the subject government section 
corner survey markers into the 1-15 right-of-way markers, as 
identified and shown them by Memmott, but failed to do so, but 
for two locations. (Transcript, pp. 21, 43, 48-49, 51, 102, 
103-106, 112-115, 117, 118, 122-123, 134, 136, 166-167, 169-
170). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I-
The evidence was insufficient to support the lower 
court's finding that EWP substantially performed the work re-
quested of it by Memmott. 
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I. 
The admission of a copy of the alleged operative docu-
ment, under the circumstances of this case, was contrary to Rule 
1003 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, nor does the evidence suf-
ficiently support such admission or the courtfs finding that it 
was a valid and binding contract. 
1 1 1
 • 
If the contract is found to be valid and binding as to 
Ralph Memmott then, as per Utah law, it is likewise valid and 
binding as regards the other named defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING 
THAT EWP SUBSTANTIALLY PERFORMED 
THE WORK REQUESTED OF IT BY MEMMOTT. 
The lower court, per its Memorandum Decision, found 
that EWP had substantially performed the services that Memmott 
had requested. Specifically, 
"EWP has provided all existing survey ties, 
location of defendants1 mining claims in 
relationship to the interstate highway as 
indicated on the Department of Transporta-
tion's highway strip maps and further pro-
vided the defendant with a GLO map showing 
the location of the interstate highway as 
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it related to the defendants1 claims. Such 
survey work and office work as was perform-
ed by the [plaintiff] and the resulting 
work product was sufficient to substantial-
ly comply with the intent of the parties 
and to satisfy the needs of the defen-
dants." 
It is here submitted that once the evidence that the lower court 
presumably relied upon to support its findings is viewed in that 
light most favorable to the court's decision, the insufficiency 
of the same will become clear. K.J. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Cambelt International Corp. v. Dalton, 69 
U.A.R. 6, 8 (Utah 1987); Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982 
(Utah 1986); Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250 
(Utah 1985); Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757 (Utah 1985). 
Although the lower court's findings do not point out 
the specific bases of evidentiary support, it would appear that 
such is based upon EWP's providing to Memmott, among other 
items, Exhibits "3", "4", "10", "11" and "12" and primarily, Mr. 
Watson's testimony regarding these exhibits. 
As provided by the record, it is Mr. Watson's testi-
mony that the GLO maps, (Exhibits "10" - "12"), were blank when 
he received them from Memmott; that he thereafter took the legal 
descriptions of the subject mining claims, verified them and 
then plotted and colored them in on the GLO maps. 
Next, is Exhibit "3", the 1-15 right-of-way strip 
maps, consisting of 13 pages. On these, EWP shaded in the loca-
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tion of the various claims. Lastly, Exhibit "4", which is a 
drawing showing two of the surveyed ties into the 1-15 right-of-
way from two of the government section corner monuments, along 
with the survey data showing the distances and measurements from 
each government monument to the 1-15 right-of-way, as well as 
certain comparative data. 
Thus, from the foregoing exhibits, Mr. Watson's testi-
mony and Mr. Grimshawfs testimony, the lower court found that 
EWP had substantially performed the services requested of it. 
As the cases cited at the outset make clear, it is not 
this court's prerogative to upset the lower court's finding 
where supported by sufficient and substantial evidence. How-
ever, it is submitted that some review of the evidence by this 
Court is necessary when an appeal is brought questioning the 
sufficiency of the evidence so to make possible the determina-
tion that the lower court's finding was indeed substantially and 
sufficiently supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the fol-
lowing observations are made. 
Memmott here concedes that the drawing, Exhibit "4", 
is the type of information and data that the defendants were 
seeking from EWP, except for the comparison data between the 
"as-built" 1-15 versus that shown on the Utah Department of 
Transportation strip maps. And, by EWP's own testimony, Exhibit 
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"4" shows only two (out of at least 12) of the survey ties from 
the subject government section monuments to the right-of-way of 
1-15 (T. at p. 77), despite EWP having spent two days' worth of 
surveying to gather the data as to each of the government sec-
tion monuments shown to them by Memmott. The continual reason 
given for EWPfs inability to provide the same information for 
each of the government monuments previously located by Memmott 
was that there were only two places on the 1-15 right-of-way 
strip maps from which EWP could compare the information that EWP 
had personally field surveyed with the information that was on 
the right-of-way strip maps. (T. at p. 105). However, and as 
Memmott testified, he was already aware that EWP would not be 
able to make any sort of comparison with the Utah Department of 
Transportation strip maps in that such data was not available, 
but Memmott only wanted the information regarding the distances 
from each government monument to the 1-15 right-of-way markers. 
(T. at pp. 139-140). And, as was testified to by Mr. Watson, 
Mr. Grimshaw and Memmotts1 expert witness, Mr. Ludlow, a draw-
ing, similar to Exhibit "4," could have been provided for each 
government monument that EWP had surveyed into the 1-15 right-
of-way, showing on each such drawing the distance and measure-
ments as surveyed from each such monument to the right-of-way 
markers. The only difference between these drawings and Exhibit 
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"4" would be that there wouldn't be any comparative data between 
what EWP had surveyed and what the Utah Department of Transpor-
tation showed on the strip maps as to the location of 1-15. 
Both Mr. Watson and Mr. Grimshaw testified that this information 
was available and that they had taken this data down in their 
field notes through the two days' worth of field survey work. 
Further, Mr. Ludlow testified he could have provided the draw-
ings, along with the sought information, for a third of the 
cost. 
As regards the GLO maps, it is only Mr. Watson that 
testifies that he marked the subject mining claims onto the GLO 
maps, Exhibits "10" - "12". Both Ralph Memmott and Sandra Mem-
mott testified that it was they who had made any markings, with 
Sandra Memmott also identifying some of her handwriting on the 
subject GLO maps. 
And, likewise, an examination of the 1-15 right-of-way 
strip maps, Exhibit "3", shows no distinct borderline between 
the subject mining claims. Each claim simply melds one into the 
other, lacking any data, once again, of any distances or meas-
urements from the right-of-way to any government monuments which 
would indicate where 1-15 was located in relation to the boun-
daries of the subject claims. Again, it is uncontroverted that 
EWP had this data and could have provided this information. 
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All the witnesses are in agreement that Memmott had 
previously marked the relevant government section monuments and 
then showed them to the EWP representatives. The record is also 
missing any explanation as to why EWP shows on its bill 34 hours 
of actual field survey time while both Mr. Watson and Mr. Grim-
shaw testified that they put in two days1 worth of field survey-
ing, 12 hours the first day and 13 1/2 hours the second day, 
which produces an 8 1/2 hour discrepancy. 
As is pointed out above, when the evidence that is 
presumably supporting the lower court's finding is marshalled 
and examined in a light most favorable to EWP, it can be seen 
that such is insufficient to support such finding. 
ARGUMENT II. 
THE ADMISSION OF A COPY OF THE ALLEGED 
OPERATIVE DOCUMENT, UNDER THE CIRCUM-
STANCES OF THIS CASE, IS CONTRA TO RULE 
1003 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, NOR 
DOES THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT 
SUCH ADMISSION OR THE COURT'S FINDING 
THAT IT WAS A VALID AND BINDING CONTRACT. 
As regards the Courtfs finding that Ralph Memmott and 
EWP entered into a valid and binding contract, the evidence 
supporting such appears to be based upon Mr. Watson1 s and Mr. 
Grimshawfs testimony and, primarily, the admitting into evidence 
of a copy of the alleged contract, Exhibit "1". 
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The record is clear that Exhibit "1" is a copy and 
that such was admitted over Memmottfs objections as being not 
the original and therefore not the best evidence. Apparently, 
the court felt the testimony given regarding EWPfs claim that 
the original had been lost by one or the other party and could 
not be found despite the diligent search made by EWP satisfied 
Rules 1003 and 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The admission into evidence of Exhibit "1" as based 
upon Rules 1003 and 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in this 
case conflicts with the standard regarding admissibility under 
these circumstances. 
While Mr. Grimshaw did testify that he saw Mr. Watson 
filling the subject document in sometime during the lunch hour 
on the first day of the field survey, which Mr. Watson's testi-
mony tends to corroborate, it is also clear that only Mr. Watson 
saw Mr. Ralph Memmott sign anything, despite Mr. Watson, Mr. 
Grimshaw, Mr. Crapo and Ms. Memmott all being present at the 
time. Additionally, the record does not contain any testimony 
from anyone other than Mr. Watson as to what terms he placed in 
the alleged contract. Not even Mr. Watson. 
It would also appear that additional support was found 
by the Court when Ralph Memmott testified that the document he 
signed was merely a work authorization form containing no writ-
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ing or printing on the sheet other than his signature appearing 
in the left-hand bottom of the sheet. 
The court admitted the subject document pursuant to 
Rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, presumably finding that 
Mr. Watson1s explanation for the disappearance of the original 
was sufficient to support such admission. Such explanation is 
in accordance with Rule 1003 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and 
is also recognized as being necessary by our courts, as well as 
our sister states, under certain circumstances and conditions. 
Meyer v. General Amer. Corp. v. McCurtain, 569 P.2d 1094, 1096 
(Utah 1977); Velasquez v. Freeman, 415 P.2d 514 (Or. 1966); 
Freightliner Corp. v. Gyles, 521 P.2d 1, 5 (Or. 1974); High v. 
Davis, The Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Skyline Enterprises Inc.; 
582 P.2d 725, 735 (Or. 1978). 
Clearly, the admission of this duplicate, under this 
case and its circumstances, violates both subparts of Rule 1003. 
It is submitted that Mr. Memmott's testimony is im-
portant and tends to cloud the question of authenticity, which 
is necessary for admissibility, in that it is also reasonable, 
given Mr. Memmottfs considerable past mining experience and 
familiarity with these types of standard forms, that he would 
remember what it was he signed and what it showed on its face. 
Mr. Memmott denies, and has always denied, that he ever signed 
any such agreement. 
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It is also reasonable that he would have recalled if 
there had been printing of some sort and to some extent on the 
face of the document spelling out any terms. The question is 
raised as to why Ralph Memmott would sign any document showing 
an estimated price well over what he believed EWP had quoted him 
at the first meeting. 
Further, and upon examination of Exhibit "1", one 
notices that there are two dates appearing on its face. One is 
October 2, 1983 and appears to be the date when EWP executed the 
alleged contract. Mr. Memmottfs signature appears, dated on 
October 17, 1983. And yet, both Mr. Watson and Mr. Grimshaw 
have testified that the alleged document was filled in by Mr. 
Watson on the first day of the field survey, or October 17, 
1983. 
Lastly, it is Mr. Watsonfs testimony regarding the 
efforts he put into trying to locate the original document. (T. 
pp. 60-61). This explanation falls short where he claims dili-
gence in searching for a document that isnft in the usual place 
that an original is kept per EWPfs usual business practice and 
then trying to cover for this by stating that he contacted Ralph 
Memmott in an attempt to locate the original of the document. 
Mr. Memmott testified that the first time he ever saw 
the subject document was when he was served with a Complaint in 
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this action and it appeared as an exhibit to the Complaint. 
Note two things: 1) Ralph Memraott has always denied seeing or 
signing this document; and, 2) EWP made but one request for the 
document, be it the original or a copy, through its discovery. 
At which time the defendants1 response was that EWP already had 
the requested document. No other attempts were made or appear 
of record as to the subject document. 
The real importance of this inquiry is contained in 
the language of subpart 2 of Rule 1003 in that, under the cir-
cumstances of this case, it is obviously unfair to admit this 
copy. As stated in the preceding cases and the 1987 Utah case 
of Billings v. Nielson, 738 P.2d 1047 (Utah App. 1987) at p. 
1049: 
"Rule 1002 exists because presenting to the 
court the exact words of some writings is 
of more than average importance, particu-
larly in dispositive or operative docu-
ments. A slight difference in words may 
result in a great difference in rights." 
(Emphasis added). 
It is submitted that this is precisely the situation we have 
here. For instance, without Exhibit "1", we have only Mr. Wat-
son's oral testimony that the $45 per hour charge for a survey 
team was not made. Both Mr. Memmott's and Mr. Crapo's testimony 
suggests otherwise. Likewise, it is the only document showing 
any other dollar estimates for any type of services as well as 
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providing a written listing of what the services allegedly were, 
all of which favors EWP. Without Exhibit "1", EWP's case comes 
down to a weighing of Mr. Watson's testimony against that of Mr. 
Memmott's, Mr. Crapofs, Mr. Ludlow's, and Ms. Memmott's. In 
fact, to some extent, even Mr. Grimshaw's testimony conflicts 
with Mr. Watson's. 
The same arguments as discussed above come into play 
as regards the question of whether the evidence supports the 
court's finding that Mr. Memmott and EWP signed a contract. 
Without Exhibit "1", the evidence is unclear as to what the 
terras of their agreement is, as only Mr. Watson saw Mr. Memmott 
sign the alleged contract. But, EWP can't find the original 
despite a "diligent" search therefor. The copy, however, con-
veniently shows up, and despite being wholly in EWP's favor and 
changing the terms of the deal to something other than what both 
Mr. Crapo and Mr. Memmott have testified to, is admitted and 
found to be a valid and binding contract. The weight of the 
evidence, as suggested above, shows otherwise. 
There are simply too many questions left unanswered as 
well as many inferences that stand out with regard to the al-
leged contract that would allow such to be admitted without the 
original pursuant to Rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
let alone the insufficiency of the evidence supporting the find-
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ing that such was a valid and binding contract in light of Ex-
hibit "1" being the only basis for such finding. 
ARGUMENT III. 
IF THE CONTRACT IS FOUND TO BE 
VALID AND AND BINDING AS TO RALPH 
MEMMOTT THEN, AS PER UTAH LAW, IT 
IS LIKEWISE VALID AND BINDING AS 
REGARDS THE OTHER NAMED DEFENDANTS. 
As was recognized by the 1908 Utah case of Bentley v. 
Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 94 P. 736, a mining partnership will be 
found to exist where there exists the two prerequisites of joint 
ownership and operation of the land for mineral purposes. See, 
also, Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, et. al, Christensen 
Diamond Products v. Covey, et. al, 2 Utah 2d 85, 269 P.2d 854, 
858 (Utah 1954). There need not be specific partnership docu-
mentation or an agreement as long as the joint ownership and 
operation of the land for mineral purposes exists. Further, it 
has been found that the operation of the claim need not be on an 
equal footing. As long as the above prerequisites exist, there 
can be a division of the duties and responsibilities of manage-
ment and operation of the claims without destroying the partner-
ship. Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, et. al, supra, at p. 
859. A mining partnership has "developed as a special type of 
partnership peculiarly adapted to serve the mining industry." 
Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, et. al, supra, p. 857. 
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The testimony establishes that the named defendants 
were co-owners in the subject claims. (T. at pp. 13, 28 and 29, 
159). This was also understood by EWP by virtue of the Com-
plaint naming the individuals as it did. Further, and given 
Ralph Memmottfs 36 years of experience as a professional miner 
and his close relationship to the co-owners, his representation 
of the others would seem only natural. 
The record nowhere indicates that EWP thought that 
Ralph Memmott was not representing the others when he and Mr. 
Crapo first contacted EWP. Additionally, if one were to review 
Utah Code Annotated, §48-1-6 (1953), such finding appears to run 
counter to this as well. There is no evidence that Ralph Mem-
mott did not have this authority, nor is there any evidence that 
EWP was provided with any information that Ralph Memmott could 
not act on behalf of the others. Again, given Ralph Memmottfs 
experience as a professional miner, the close relationship be-
tween all the named defendants, and that on at least one of the 
days in the field, Sandra Memmott was present along with Mr. 
Crapo and Mr. Memmott, and offered no objection to EWP's pres-
ence and the anticipated work, further buttresses the acceptance 
of Ralph Memmottfs judgment regarding the claims and his repre-
sentation of the others in this regard. 
Consequently, and as was pointed out in Memmottfs 
Motion for a New Trial, the lower court's finding that the con-
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tract, Exhibit "1" herein, only bound Ralph Memmott is contra to 
both Utah Code Annotated §48-1-6 (1953), and the case law which 
has developed in the area of mining partnerships. As a further 
consequence, Ralph Memmott is entitled to contribution from his 
partners should the lower court's judgment be affirmed. Jensen 
v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1973). 
CONCLUSION 
As the cases in this area tend to point out, there is 
a fine line between sufficiency and insufficiency of evidence 
supporting any court's finding. Due to the fineness of this 
line, it is appropriate that the trial court be given a great 
amount of discretion in coming to this determination without the 
risk of it being overturned as a result of one party or the 
other being dissatisfied with the decision. However, this Court 
has also recognized that when a finding is made by a lower court 
which is not supported by the weight of the evidence, such a 
finding does in fact need to be reviewed to establish this suf-
ficiency of evidence and, if lacking, something done to rectify. 
It is submitted that this case falls within this latter category 
and, as is demonstrated above, the findings of the Court do not 
comport with the weight of the evidence. The finding that the 
respondent and Mr. Memmott entered into a valid and binding 
contract, as shown above, also suffers from this same problem. 
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Further, it appears that the admission of the subject 
document into evidence, despite the Best Evidence Rule, was also 
insupportable pursuant to the standards of the cases provided 
herein and Utah's own Rules of Evidence. 
Lastly, and because of the existence of a mining part-
nership as between the named defendants herein, the ability of 
one partner (Ralph Memmott) to bind the others where such is 
done pursuant to the business is clear. The lower court's find-
ing as to liability on the part of only Mr. Ralph Memmott ig-
nores the general idea behind partnership and that of contribu-
tion from the other partners where one partner is required to 
make payment in the line of the partnership interests and busi-
ness . 
Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the 
lower court's findings be reversed for the reasons stated here-
in. 
DATED this J? / day of January, 1988. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
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